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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Agricultural development corridors and clusters are 
highly complex projects that have been driven in 
Africa by agribusiness and mining corporations, host 
governments, international donors and development 
finance institutions. There is interest in whether these 
projects can support inclusive agribusiness. Evidence 
shows that involvement of small-scale economic actors 
in such initiatives is often impeded by a failure to grant 
them participation or a voice. We therefore investigated if 
and how recent corridors and clusters in Africa have been 
able to achieve the meaningful engagement of small-
scale economic actors, with a focus on smallholders, 
including pastoralists, and the women among them. 
Eight initiatives were studied during the period 2018–19: 
Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport Corridor 
in Kenya; Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of 
Tanzania; Nacala Corridor in Mozambique and Malawi, 
incorporating the ProSAVANA agricultural development 
programme; Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor 
in Mozambique and Zambia; Lagos–Kano–Jibiya 
Agricultural Growth Corridor in Nigeria; Bagré Growth 
Pole in Burkina Faso; Lobito Corridor in Angola, linking 
to Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia; and 
Walvis Bay–Ndola–Lubumbashi Development Corridor 
in Namibia, Zambia and Democratic Republic of Congo.
Based on a review of the literature and interviews with 
experts, we observed that smallholder and women’s 
organisations were rarely invited to contribute to the 
conception and design of the corridor and growth 
pole projects and are only minimally involved in their 
governance. As the projects have unfolded, land rights 
abuses have occurred and some poorly designed 
support programmes were initiated. However, we 
document attempts at engagement of smallholders 
during phases of consultation, land allocation and 
project implementation.
Challenges to increasing and deepening their 
engagement include a lack of effective organisations 
to represent small-scale producers and businesses; 
inadequate structures for information-sharing, 
monitoring and accountability; some incorrect 
assumptions and biases; overly centralised planning 
and decision-making; and the need for project 
planners to address the commercial needs of private-
sector investors.
We find that the prospects of smallholder and women’s 
group inclusion are better in demand-driven initiatives 
and/or initiatives that are strongly influenced by donors 
or development partners which prioritise smallholder 
infrastructure or value chain programmes with access 
to financing; and that are not strongly influenced by 
agribusiness firms whose strategic priorities include 
large-scale land acquisition or commodity extraction. 
The report identified a systematic lack of engagement 
of smallholders and small-scale businesspeople in 
the concept and design stage of spatial development 
initiatives. The resulting development visions are not 
always appropriate to a smallholder context, but there 
are ways – both deliberate and unintended – in which 
the extent of investment in large-scale farms and 
plantations can be lessened.
Project managers, governments, donors and lenders 
can take measures to improve the engagement of 
smallholders and women. For example, they can build 
the capacity of farmers’ and women’s organisations 
to participate in decision-making structures and 
set quotas for their inclusion in governance bodies. 
Governments and lenders can introduce requirements 
for smallholder inclusion and gender-sensitive 
approaches as conditions and selection criteria for 
agricultural investments, farmer training and value chain 
programmes, while project managers can establish 
communications and monitoring procedures. Overall, 
the managers of corridor and growth pole projects 
must learn the lessons from past initiatives and begin 
dialogues with small-scale agricultural actors as soon as 
possible in the development process.
Corridors and growth poles have been shaped not only 
by external forces, but also by local politics, dynamics and 
confrontations among actors. Outside formal structures, 
smallholders and women have forced an increase in their 
engagement through activism and resistance. These 
energies can be amplified and channeled by neutral 
third parties. Too often, non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) programmes have been limited, but effective 
civil society can help to mediate between stakeholders 
and develop innovative ways in which the voices of 
smallholders and women can be heard. On this basis, 
we find that including smallholders, pastoralists and 
women from the outset of these initiatives is central 
to ensure successful implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of their outcomes. 
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1.1. Background
This Working Paper presents findings from qualitative 
research on recent development corridors and 
agribusiness clusters in sub-Saharan Africa. These 
corridors and clusters are large-scale initiatives which 
are aimed at improving business, trade and agriculture 
through public-sector funding and private capital. 
The clusters, known as growth poles in West Africa, 
focus on agricultural production and agribusiness 
linkages. Corridors tend to have a wider remit, often 
involving the extractives and transport industries, but 
may also be designed with agricultural development 
in mind. Both corridors and clusters usually include 
investment in hard infrastructure, such as roads or 
irrigation infrastructure, and in soft infrastructure and 
skills, such as farmer training, building commercial 
relationships between actors in a supply chain or 
simplifying border crossings. 
From a development perspective, corridors and 
clusters or growth poles are conceived so that local 
smallholders and small businesses will come into 
closer proximity with larger companies. Corridors are 
expected to link local farmers and businesspeople 
to national or international markets, while agricultural 
clusters or growth poles are intended to create local 
hubs where large farms will generate positive spillover 
effects and commercial actors up- and downstream1 
will create more business opportunities.
If designed correctly, therefore, corridors and clusters 
or growth poles are intended by their proponents to 
promote inclusive agribusiness in Africa. Achieving 
agribusiness that is inclusive of low-income and 
marginalised groups has become a major priority for 
donors and international finance institutions (Woodhill, 
2016; Chamberlain and Anseeuw, 2019). Small-scale 
family operations, or smallholdings, predominate in 
African agriculture (Christiaensen and Demery, 2017), 
and women are critical to smallholder production: they 
are estimated to provide 40 per cent of all labour in 
crop farming in six African countries, and 52 per cent 
just in Tanzania, one of the countries in this present 
study (Palacios-Lopez, Christiaensen and Kilic, 
2017).2  However, critical observers point to barriers 
that sometimes prevent smallholders and women 
from sustained participation in the potentially lucrative 
markets promoted by corridors and clusters. One large 
barrier to inclusion is that smallholders and women 
may be excluded from having a voice in the design and 
governance of public–private partnerships and spatial 
development initiatives (Fairtrade Foundation, 2014; 
Oxfam Novib, 2015).
This research study therefore investigated if and how 
recent corridors and clusters have been able to achieve 
the participation of smallholders, including livestock 
keepers and pastoralists, and women in particular.3 
The aim of this study was to identify common 
challenges and pitfalls, and to highlight key lessons 
that could be shared with organisations involved in 
spatial development initiatives in Africa to enhance their 
prospects for long-term stability and effectiveness.
1.2. The challenge of participation
‘Participation’ is a loaded term which can be used to 
describe various degrees of involvement (Hickey and 
Mohan, 2004). Tanwir and Safdar (2013) note that some 
authors describe participation as a spectrum from low 
to high, such as Agarwal’s spectrum from ‘nominal’ to 
‘empowering’ participation, and Cornwall’s spectrum 
from ‘functional’ to ‘transformative’ participation. 
Like Agarwal and Cornwall, Tanwir and Safdar argue 
that people’s – particularly women’s – participation 
in development projects should be empowering and 
transformative. Fairtrade Foundation (2014) use the 
alternative term ‘engagement’ to describe all instances 
of involvement by people in public–private partnerships 
in agriculture. They agree that the process should be 
empowering, but their ultimate goal is not participation 
but ownership. 
When it comes to long-term and large-scale spatial 
development initiatives such as corridors or growth 
poles, an important potential area of engagement 
is in the governance of the initiative. ‘Governance’ 
here describes the system of decision-making and 
oversight of implementation, information dissemination 
and relationship-building involved in the development 
initiative (Schut, Soares, van de Ven and Slingerland, 
2014; Vogelsperger, Lakoussan and Teshome, 2017). 
Some authors note that governance of these initiatives 
includes balancing the needs of the public and private 
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sector (e.g. Gálvez, Nogales and Webber, 2017). To 
achieve truly inclusive agribusiness, however, it is also 
important to recognise unequal power relations of 
other stakeholders and to actively pursue engagement 
of smallholder farmers, small businesses and women 
(Fairtrade Foundation, 2014; Oxfam Novib, 2015). 
Thus, the governance of development initiatives should 
follow similar principles to democratic governance 
in public life, empowering citizens to have a say in 
decision-making processes, improve levels of inclusion 
of individual citizens in policy processes and increase 
the legitimacy of decisions made (Michels, 2011). 
Cotula et al. (2019) call for the development of a socio-
legal empowerment framework, whereby smallholders 
may increase their agency in the realm of commercial 
agriculture by using a combination of legal processes, 
improved access to information, greater capacity for 
collective action and clearer channels for engagement 
with other actors.
Experience from other public–private partnerships 
and development projects suggests that achieving 
meaningful engagement of smallholder farmers and 
women is a challenge to the status quo. In general, 
they rarely co-design projects and are inadequately 
consulted, so awareness is low and structures of 
engagement are not built in from the start (ASFG, 2013; 
Fairtrade Foundation, 2014). Often, there is a lack of 
well-organised, representative farmer groups or apex 
organisations for project managers to work with. Poole 
(2017) argues that decision-making and governance 
are often too centralised, without sufficient input from 
local or provincial authorities and producer groups 
who can communicate the complexities and priorities 
of their specific contexts. Fairtrade Foundation (2014) 
found that the risk of top-down exclusion is especially 
high in so-called ‘demand-driven’ projects – that is, 
agricultural projects that are driven by the commercial 
needs of private-sector partners. Another issue is a 
proliferation of governance bodies such as committees 
and working groups, especially if their mandates or 
membership structures change over time. This can 
lead to farmer groups and civil society becoming 
marginalised or even leaving the process (see Schut 
et al., 2014). Women face particular challenges in 
achieving representation in development projects, 
owing to competing demands on their time for work 
and childcare and to the fact that women often have 
less education and access to decision-making bodies 
than men (Tanwir and Safdir, 2013).
These experiences suggest that achieving engagement 
of smallholder farmers, small businesses and women 
is an ongoing challenge for project managers, yet 
crucial for the long-term success of the initiative. 
Given the complexity and power imbalances of spatial 
development initiatives, engagement will not happen 
organically; it must be consciously planned for with 
governance structures and feedback mechanisms, 
capacity-building and mediation if needed. This is all 
much easier to achieve if smallholder farmers, small 
businesses and women are involved from the very 
beginning of the process, but it is also possible to 
bring them in and build working relationships and 
trust over time.
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Eight initiatives – seven development corridors and one 
growth pole – were selected for study:
Eastern Africa:
1. Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport 
Corridor (LAPSSET) in Kenya
2. Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania 
(SAGCOT)
3. Nacala Corridor in Mozambique and Malawi, 
incorporating the ProSAVANA agricultural 
development programme
4. Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor (BAGC) in 
Mozambique and Zambia
West Africa:
5. Lagos–Kano–Jibiya (LAKAJI) Agricultural Growth 
Corridor in Nigeria
6. Bagré Growth Pole in Burkina Faso
Central and Southern Africa:
7. Lobito Corridor in Angola, linking to Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Zambia
8. Walvis Bay–Ndola–Lubumbashi Development 
Corridor (WBNLDC) in Namibia, Zambia and 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Some of the initiatives were completely agriculture-
focused, while others addressed agriculture only 
indirectly. All were live in 2019, with the possible 
exception of the LAKAJI Corridor. This corridor 
development initiative was funded by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) through 
the Nigeria Expanded Trade and Transport project, 
which officially ended in September 2017, and we 
were not able to ascertain if the Nigerian government 
or private investors are continuing activities in the 
corridor region.
This research study was conducted in two stages. 
In Stage 1 we drew on public documents, academic 
papers published by researchers who had accessed 
the inner workings of the initiatives, and eight expert 
interviews, to assess the participation of small-scale 
producers (smallholder farmers and pastoralists) 
and women at different stages of the initiatives’ 
development. The expert interviews were held during 
the first half of 2018 with researchers and development 
practitioners who were closely familiar with the 
initiatives; they are not identified in this paper to protect 
their anonymity.
Stage 2 involved deeper analysis of five corridor 
initiatives: BAGC, LAPSSET, Lobito, Nacala and 
SAGCOT (Figure 2.1). Members of the research team 
conducted fieldwork in Angola, Kenya, Mozambique 
and Tanzania. Through interviews and focus groups 
with farmers, producer organisations, businesspeople, 
corridor officials, local authorities, NGOs and a range 
of other stakeholders, we assessed the progress 
and impacts of each initiative, and expanded the 
preliminary findings from Stage 1. The fieldwork was 
conducted during 2018 and 2019, both in rural corridor 
regions and in cities where corridor and port officials 
and NGOs are based. 
2 METHODOLOGY
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Figure 2.1. Locations of the five corridors studied in depth
Source: Chome et al. (2020)
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3.1. Origins
There has been increased interest and investment in 
corridors and other spatial development initiatives in 
sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. For example, the 
Walvis Bay Corridor Group was established in 2000, 
proposals for SAGCOT in Tanzania emerged around 
2008, and plans for a Nacala development corridor in 
Mozambique were announced in 2010.
Three major forces have driven this activity 
(Smalley, 2017). First, private-sector actors such 
as food manufacturers, mining firms and fertiliser 
producers have been demanding better road and 
rail infrastructure, unambiguous access to land, 
and greater access to rural communities, both to 
source agricultural commodities from them and to 
sell agricultural inputs and services to them. African 
governments are under pressure to support foreign 
investors in those goals, and corridors and clusters or 
growth poles provide a neat mechanism to channel 
investment where it is needed by the private sector. 
Secondly, governments have been leveraging that 
investment in infrastructure and business to promote 
economic development in corridor or cluster regions. In 
this way, they are continuing a strategy first popularised 
by New Partnership for Africa's Development in the 
1990s with projects such as the Maputo Development 
Corridor, by transforming historical transport routes 
into regional development projects. Thirdly, donors 
and international finance institutions have supported 
corridors and agricultural clusters or growth poles 
because these kinds of projects align well with themes 
that many of those organisations are prioritising, such 
as infrastructural improvements, cross-border trade, 
value chain development and linking smallholders to 
nucleus and/or processor estates4  as well as private-
sector development.
Detailed reviews of sub-Saharan Africa’s corridors and 
clusters are available elsewhere (see Gálvez Nogales 
and Webber, 2017; Picard, Coulibaly and Smaller, 2017; 
Smalley, 2017). These reviews highlight that these 
initiatives are highly complex projects that emerge 
from a convergence of interests. Because corridors 
are so large and complex, they are usually designed 
as umbrella projects that cover many other types of 
spatial development initiatives and investments. For 
example, the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor is 
a growth corridor which includes individual private-
sector greenfield investments and is linked to the 
World Bank’s PROIRRI irrigation project. Furthermore, 
the nature of such initiatives tends to evolve over 
time, with many beginning life as transport corridors 
using existing or rehabilitated infrastructure, to which 
development goals are added.
3.2. Key differences between initiatives
Three key points of difference were identified between 
the eight initiatives and similar spatial development 
initiatives: the degree of local embeddedness; the 
emphasis in their strategy for agricultural development; 
and their driving force.
3.2.1. Degree of local embeddedness
Some corridor initiatives emphasise the linear 
movement of goods from the hinterland to the coast, 
and vice versa. Efforts focus on improving transport 
infrastructure and soft infrastructure at border 
crossings and checkpoints. In this way, a corridor can 
function as a tunnel for channelling raw commodities 
from inland zones to processors, consumers and 
ports on the coast. They are not deeply embedded in 
local economies.
Other corridors were designed to foster more local 
links, through interventions such as local training 
programmes, support for small and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) business linkages or ‘last mile’ 
infrastructure (Smalley, 2017). These development and 
growth corridors still have a linear corridor aspect but 
are more networked and mosaic-like than transport, 
logistics and trade corridors. 
At the other end of the scale are clusters and growth 
poles. They lack the linear emphasis of corridors 
and are highly locally embedded. Their infrastructure 
investment is likely to centre on the cluster or 
growth pole area itself to improve irrigation, last mile 
infrastructure or warehousing. A disadvantage is that 
agri-clusters and growth poles may not pay as much 
attention as other spatial development initiatives to 
long-distance supply chain linkages. For example, 
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farmers in the Bagré Growth Pole in Burkina Faso who 
received support in irrigated rice production then faced 
challenges in marketing their rice (interview, expert 
respondent, 29 May 2018).
3.2.2. Emphasis in strategy for agricultural 
development
Another way in which the eight initiatives vary is in 
the kinds of agricultural and agribusiness activities 
and investments they prioritise. Neither LAPSSET 
nor WBNLDC had set out a clear vision by 2019 for 
what agricultural development would look like in their 
corridor regions. They are more accurately understood 
as trade or economic corridors which have the potential 
to add an agricultural development component in time. 
In contrast, the other six initiatives had agricultural 
strategies, promising an increase in large-scale 
agriculture, a rise in smallholder productivity and use of 
inputs, and greater value addition, market linkages and 
trade. However, the initiatives differ in how much they 
prioritise each objective. Often, multiple stakeholders 
who each prioritise different elements may become 
involved in the same initiative. This can lead to complex 
project designs and to contradictory project visions. 
3.2.3. Driving force
A large number of actors are found to be shaping 
the design and implementation of agricultural spatial 
development initiatives. Researchers have observed 
that within and beyond Africa, the strongest influence 
behind corridor initiatives can vary – typically either 
the private sector, the host government or a donor or 
international finance institution will have been the most 
influential actor (Byiers, Molina and Engel, 2016).
Several of the eight cases were principally driven 
by the private sector. Fairtrade Foundation (2014) 
describes such cases as demand-driven initiatives: 
projects that are shaped by the commercial interests of 
private-sector partners and focused on commodities 
of interest to private-sector market actors. In other 
cases, donors and the host government have been 
more influential, and a greater proportion of the 
development cost is met by the state or by grants or 
concessional loans from donors and development 
finance institutions. These cases include LAPSSET, 
which was propelled by the Kenyan government’s 
geopolitical aims, and LAKAJI in Nigeria, which was 
initiated by USAID. The African Development Bank 
(AfDB) designed a plan for a new phase of development 
for the Lobito Corridor, with the support of the Angolan 
and Zambian governments. The governments of Brazil 
and Japan have had a strong influence on several 
initiatives through involvement in project conception 
and the provision of development finance, particularly 
in Mozambique and Angola.
A summary of the three key differences between 
development initiatives is presented in Figure 3.1.
Based on this analysis, and bearing in mind their 
evolving nature, the eight initiatives can be categorised 
into four groups:
1. Transport or early development corridor 
which was designed by the state to support 
extractives and trade but may be beginning to 
develop a strategy for the agricultural sector. 
Examples: LAPSSET, WBLNDC
Figure 3.1. Key differences between the eight development initiatives
(some cases straddle two categories or evolve from one category to another)
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2. Demand-driven agricultural growth corridor, 
which is driven by the private sector and 
emphasises large-scale agriculture and some 
measures on productivity and inputs. Examples: 
SAGCOT
3. Smallholder-focused corridor or growth 
pole with a strong emphasis on productivity 
or value chain development, driven by donors, 
development financial institutions or government. 
Examples: LAKAJI, Bagré Growth Pole
4. Hybrid model, evolved from a transport corridor, 
with both private-sector and government influence 
and contrasting visions over whether to focus on 
large- or small-scale agriculture. Examples: Beira, 
Nacala and its ProSAVANA programme, AfDB 
plans for expanding on Lobito corridor
These differences do not only affect the character of 
the initiative. They also affect the likelihood that small-
scale producers will be given a voice in the design 
and decision-making of the initiative, and that they will 
benefit from the investments.
3.3. Progress of the eight initiatives in 
2019
3.3.1. Governance and funding
As of 2019, each initiative had an established 
governance structure. This typically included a 
dedicated office, partnership group or development 
authority and in some cases a separate administrative 
secretariat. The governance bodies administered the 
initiatives and raised and allocated funding. Some, for 
example, SAGCOT, BAGC and Nacala, established 
their own catalytic funds to provide concessional 
loans, grants or private equity finance for corridor 
projects. The initiatives were typically structured as 
public–private partnerships, and public and private 
sources of funding were committed by a wide 
range of organisations including host governments, 
bilateral donors such as DFID, USAID and Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), lenders such 
as the World Bank, International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and African Development Bank, agri-food 
and fertiliser companies, and mining, logistics and 
telecommunications companies. For example, nearly 
30 partners pledged around US$1 billion in investment 
for SAGCOT (Bergius, 2016). It is doubtful that all these 
commitments have been realised.
3.3.2. Corridor infrastructure
Perhaps the most visible evidence of progress in 
2019 was the construction or rehabilitation of hard 
infrastructure in corridor regions. This included work 
on the ports of Beira in Mozambique, Lamu in Kenya, 
Lobito in Angola and Lüderitz in Namibia, and on 
railways in Angola and Mozambique. Substantial 
road improvements had taken place, mainly of 
highways or trunk roads along corridor routes such 
as the highways in the LAPSSET, Lobito, Nacala, 
SAGCOT and WBLNDC corridors. There was also 
some investment in agricultural infrastructure such as 
irrigation, warehouses and grain stores, abattoirs and 
processing plants. 
However, interviews suggested that much more 
agricultural infrastructure was needed. Often this 
meant more investment in rural roads and last-mile 
transport services. A representative of the BAGC 
secretariat said: ‘We still lack infrastructure, roads, 
storehouses… the truth is that the EN6 road [a 
major highway undergoing rehabilitation in central 
Mozambique] has little impact for smallholders. We 
need tertiary roads. Seventy per cent of the cost of 
some products is due to transport costs from the poor 
road conditions we have’ (interview, 22 August 2018). 
In the Lobito corridor, the lack of good rural roads and 
access to train stations was compounded by a lack of 
cargo-loading and storage facilities at the stations and 
of hauliers willing to serve rural areas.
3.3.3. Soft trade infrastructure
Although increasing cross-border trade in Africa is 
often cited as a potential benefit of development 
corridor initiatives, there was limited evidence in 2019 
for investment in soft infrastructure in this aspect. As 
part of the USAID-funded Nigeria Expanded Trade 
and Transport Program, the LAKAJI project included 
training and technical assistance for customs officials 
to address bureaucratic and regulatory bottlenecks 
at Lagos port and along the corridor. The WBLNCD 
initiative, which is another trade-oriented initiative, 
eliminated restrictions on heavy motor vehicles and 
funded activities to reduce HIV/AIDS transmission 
among truck drivers. Special economic zones had also 
been established around the cities of Beira and Nacala.
3.3.4. Large-scale agriculture
Another area of progress which was highly visible in 
the agricultural development corridors, especially in 
Mozambique, is investment in large-scale plantations 
and farms by domestic and international firms and 
individuals. In 2012, criticism began building of an 
apparent boom in large-scale land acquisition, often 
for soy in the Nacala Corridor region. Associated land 
disputes and evictions were also reported. In addition, 
Mozambique’s Beira corridor region had several large-
scale operations for cattle, jatropha and cotton, some 
of which pre-dated the official launch of BAGC in 
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2009. Researchers have found a significant increase 
in large-scale farms in the Beira region between 2002 
and 2012 – more so than in Nacala (Glover, Salvucci 
and Jones, 2016).
3.3.5. Agricultural development initiatives
In Tanzania there was evidence of several activities that 
could benefit smallholders and small agribusinesses, 
some of which were catalysed by SAGCOT. This 
involved a number of schemes to connect or contract 
small-scale farmers in dairy, rice, sunflower, Irish 
potatoes, tomatoes and tea. These included USAID-
funded training for rice farmers, support for value 
addition processing enterprises, and the DFID-funded 
SAPPHIRE II project, which involved post-harvest 
handling and grain storage for smallholder rice and 
maize farmers. 
The BAGC blueprint envisioned a similar range of 
investments in input provision and post-harvest 
facilities, but there seemed to have been less 
investment. Activities included the World Bank-funded 
PROIRRI irrigation programme and numerous pilot 
small agribusiness ventures that received funding from 
the BAGC catalytic fund. As for Nacala, a number of 
contract farming initiatives funded by JICA and by the 
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) 
involving smallholders were reported.
3.4. Positive impacts
There is some evidence that in 2019 a few smallholders, 
women and small businesses had benefited from 
infrastructural improvements and agricultural projects 
in corridor regions. For example, in Angola, post-war 
rehabilitation of the Benguela railway was found to have 
benefited female traders who use the trains to sell their 
agricultural produce at greater profit. It also triggered 
a mushrooming of new trading centres and market 
outlets at train stations and in surrounding areas. By 
increasing the movement of goods within Angola, 
the Benguela railway increased the availability of 
agricultural inputs in rural areas and facilitated a greater 
flow of information into isolated rural communities 
thereby benefiting smallholders and women trading 
food crops and other domestic equipment.
In the LAPSSET region, construction of roads between 
Isiolo and Moyale in Kenya, and from Moyale to Hawassa 
in Ethiopia, was reported to have enhanced access 
to markets, cross-border trade and local investment 
(LCDA, 2016). During focus group discussions held 
in the area of Isiolo county, residents of a pastoralist 
community told researchers that ‘construction of the 
Isiolo–Moyale Road had resulted in many positive 
developments, with enhanced transportation and 
market access for their livestock and other produce, 
increased value for their properties, and other 
opportunities’ (Kibugi, Mwathane and Makathimo, 
2016, p. 37). Travel time between Moyale and Nairobi 
was reduced from about 60 hours (more than three 
days) to just eight hours.
The PROIRRI irrigation project, which was funded by the 
World Bank, JICA and the Mozambican government but 
was designed to align with the BAGC in Mozambique, 
invested in irrigation equipment and provided funding 
for increased access to seeds, fertiliser and tractors, 
which benefited ‘675 horticulture farmers in Sofala 
and 250 rice farmers’ (World Bank, 2016b, p. 7). In 
Tanzania, a review by DFID noted a range of efforts in 
training, subsidised inputs, post-harvest or processing 
support and marketing opportunities. For example, 
in 2015, 10,461 farmers had attended maize farming 
training funded by the SAPPHIRE project, and at least 
four farmer organisations had support to operate grain 
warehouses (DFID, 2016).
3.5. Constraints on wider benefits for 
smallholders and women
While acknowledging those positive experiences, our 
research suggests that neither agricultural development 
corridors nor transport corridors were yet having as 
beneficial an impact as the planners had projected and 
as the policymakers and donors had hoped. 
The limitations of these corridor developments were 
due, in part, to considerable challenges of governance 
and funding. Corridor initiatives have proved difficult to 
administer and coordinate. The need to balance multiple 
interests means that the process of moving from 
concept to implementation is often characterised by 
delays, disagreements and a reorientation of objectives 
(Chome et al., 2020). Initiatives can become entwined 
in local or national politics – for example, in the cases 
of LAPSSET and SAGCOT, which were destabilised 
as a result. Resistance from civil society can lead to 
further delays, as the SAGCOT and Nacala planners 
experienced. Armed confrontations between political 
factions in 2013–2016 created further instability in the 
Nacala corridor; LAPSSET was hindered by the Al-
Shabaab threat and civil war in South Sudan. Realising 
investment committed by the public and private sectors 
has also proved challenging. For example, economic 
pressures led Brazilian agribusiness investors to cool 
their interest in Mozambican development corridors, 
while the fall in global oil prices and Uganda’s change 
of its oil routing through Tanzania instead of Kenya 
undermined plans for LAPSSET.
While the problem with infrastructure may be partly 
caused by the limited investment available, it may also 
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be related to an under-appreciation of the needs and 
realities of smallholders, small agribusinesses and 
women, which appears to be limiting the ways in which 
they can benefit from corridor developments. Our 
research highlights that whereas joining commercial 
value chains is championed by corridor proponents 
as obviously good for smallholders and women, for 
the farmers and pastoralists themselves it is a much 
more complex decision. For example, pastoralists 
and smallholders we interviewed in Lamu, Kenya, 
expressed concern that opening up the region to 
commercial agriculture would exacerbate exploitation 
by local middlemen that they were already facing. 
Both pastoralists and smallholders are vulnerable, 
especially pastoralists whose access to pasture and 
water is becoming increasingly restricted by increased 
sedentarisation, the spread of communal conservation 
efforts, and land allocation for LAPSSET activities. In 
Mozambique, we found that smallholders were hesitant 
to increase production because they feared challenges 
in selling their produce. Instead, they preferred to 
combine agriculture with other livelihoods activities 
to decrease their vulnerability and spread risks. In the 
SAGCOT region, pastoralists saw agricultural projects 
like the large-scale sugarcane estates as encroaching 
on their grazing areas and blocking livestock routes 
and water points.
We argue that the needs and realities of smallholders, 
pastoralists and women could be more fully realised in 
corridor developments if they had stronger participation 
and voice in the design, implementation and oversight 
of the projects, which we explore in the next section.
15Working Paper 062 | August 2021
In this section we discuss the level of smallholder and 
women’s groups’ engagement in each area for the 
eight cases, to the extent that this was revealed in 
documents and interviews. Broadly speaking, there are 
five stages where smallholders and women’s groups 
can potentially engage in development initiatives: 
1) Concept and design; 2) Consultation; 3) Land 
allocation; 4) Governance; and 5) Implementation.
4.1. Concept and design
4.1.1. The blueprint approach
Corridors and growth poles are very large development 
and investment initiatives which are conceived and 
planned by governments, lenders and donors, 
multinational corporations and consultants. These 
initiatives are top-down and often externally driven. 
They rarely involve strategies for supplying local food 
markets or promoting low-input production systems. 
Rather, the overriding vision of agricultural and rural 
development presented in project blueprints is of a 
modern, high-input, commercialised agricultural sector 
which is closely linked to global value chains. Very 
often, the agricultural strategy is to increase production 
and trade of export commodities. The reasons for 
prioritising export-led agriculture can include a desire 
by policymakers to increase foreign exchange, by 
port authorities to increase port activity, by advisers 
and policymakers who have identified the high earning 
potential for farmers of export crops, or by multinational 
companies to increase or secure raw material supply 
(Cotula et al., 2014). IFAD advised in 2016, ‘Donors and 
governments … should look at other markets that may 
be less beneficial for each individual farmer, but have 
the potential to uplift many more family farms. The most 
important strategy for the vast majority of small-scale 
farmers, yet a strategy that paradoxically receives less 
international attention, [is] mainstream domestic food 
markets’ (IFAD, 2016, p. 240, emphasis added).
4.1.2. Challenging a large-scale vision
With the exception of Lobito Corridor, the architects of 
agricultural growth corridors and growth poles proposed 
a mixed sector of large-scale plantations or farms, 
outgrower or block farm schemes and entrepreneurial 
medium-sized farms. Policymakers may believe that 
large-scale agriculture is necessary to drive economic 
growth and technology transfer. Large-scale investors 
are also needed to help fund infrastructure. In the case 
of Bagré Growth Pole, for example, Burkina Faso’s 
government set high requirements of commercial 
investment for applicants for land to pay for the costs 
of new irrigation (World Bank, 2011). Large-scale 
agriculture is especially common in demand-driven 
initiatives where agribusiness corporations and land 
investors have a strong influence (Fairtrade Foundation, 
2014). These actors often prefer large operations to 
guarantee production or simply gain access to land as 
an economic and political asset (Cotula et al., 2014; 
Cochet, 2017). Medium-sized farmers, meanwhile, may 
be well represented in plans because policymakers or 
project implementation staff are medium-scale land-
owners themselves (interview, expert respondent, 2 
January 2018).
There are cases where smaller-scale farming is more 
prominent in plans. Sometimes the host government 
requires consultants and investors to plan for 
smallholder inclusion, such as the government 
of Tanzania (SAGCOT, 2015; Bergius, 2016); or 
development partners fund sub-projects that focus on 
smallholders or women. For example, DFID included 
three agricultural programmes as part of its contribution 
to the SAGCOT, of which two (SAPPHIRE and Chai) 
had a narrow focus on smallholders and targets 
for reaching female beneficiaries. Overall, we found 
that spatial development initiatives that are driven by 
donors or the government are less likely than demand-
driven initiatives to support the interests of large-scale 
agribusiness and more likely to address the interests of 
small and medium-sized farmers, be it with a focus on 
productivity, value chains or trade. 
After the concept and design stage, unplanned events 
may reorient the initiative closer towards smaller-
scale agriculture. One such unintended development 
occurred with the Bagré Growth Pole, where most 
agricultural investors involved in the new irrigation 
scheme had small (less than 30ha) operations focused 
on food crops. Initially, the government had targeted 
larger operations, but the high investment costs 
appear to have led investors to reduce the size of their 
proposals. This necessary shift was apparently disliked 
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by some officials who believed that larger operations 
would be needed to attract supply chain buyers and 
thus have a transformational impact (Venot et al., 2017).
4.1.3. Whose needs?
An absence of smallholder and small business voices 
at the concept and design stage means they are 
unable to challenge incorrect assumptions and the 
imposition of external priorities for crop production 
(Fairtrade Foundation, 2014). For example, DFID 
identified serious flaws in its plans for outgrower 
schemes in Beira, which were the main strategy for 
reaching smallholders. DFID noted ‘the incorrect 
assumption that farmers would be willing to work for 
future revenues even if those are potentially large, as 
avocado trees take four to six years to fruition’ (DFID, 
2017, p. 7). Similarly, there has been criticism of the 
well-intentioned rice and maize schemes of Bagré 
Growth Pole (Venot et al., 2017). A respondent told us 
that whereas the heart of the scheme is to promote 
irrigated rice farming, local farmers wanted the flexibility 
to grow other crops, such as vegetables (interview, 
expert respondent, 29 May 2018). In summary, 
we identified a systematic lack of engagement of 
smallholders and small-scale businesspeople in the 
concept and design stage of spatial development 
initiatives. The resulting development visions are not 
always appropriate to a smallholder context, but there 
are ways – both deliberate and unintended – in which 
the extent of investment in large-scale farms and 
plantations can be lessened.
4.2. Consultation
All eight initiatives included a period of consultation. 
We use the term ‘consultation’ in a broad sense, to 
include baseline and feasibility studies and interactions 
with potential investors. Consultation provides scope 
to engage smallholder farmers and herders, small-
scale businesses, and residents in corridor or cluster 
areas. However, although the evidence we reviewed 
is limited, our findings indicate that these groups were 
not sufficiently consulted. 
4.2.1. Lost voices
A common approach was to hold investor roadshows 
and conferences, whereby government representatives 
and project proponents hold meetings with investors 
and logistics, extractives and agribusiness firms to 
gauge interest and solicit proposals for land-based 
investment. As an example, the Walvis Bay corridor 
master plan was validated in May 2014 in a stakeholder 
workshop after several networking events with 
investors in Southern Africa and Brazil (WBCG, 2017).
Any agricultural interests involved in consultations 
were typically multinational or domestic agribusiness 
companies, as opposed to agricultural cooperatives or 
other organisations that might represent smallholder or 
small-business interests. One of the only examples of 
farmer consultation we found is the inclusion of Zambia 
National Farmers Union in meetings organised for the 
Lobito Corridor (Mseteka, 2015). Based on the limited 
evidence that we reviewed, other initiatives seem to 
have omitted consultation with famers’ groups, unions 
or cooperatives. For example, Bergius (2016, pp. 7-8) 
claims that although the Agricultural Council of Tanzania 
was involved in early discussions on SAGCOT, ‘the 
largest network of smallholder farmers in Tanzania – 
Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA) 
– has not at any stage participated in deliberations 
concerning SAGCOT.’
Particularly strong criticism was made of the Nacala 
consultation process in Mozambique, where it appears 
that the early ProSAVANA consultations engaged 
more with farmers from Brazil than with local farmers’ 
organisations (Schlesinger, 2014; see also Clements, 
2015, pp. 106-7). The alleged poor quality of initial 
consultations for ProSAVANA directly led to the formation 
of the ‘No to ProSAVANA!’ campaign, which had a big 
impact on how the project unfolded (Clements, 2015; 
see below).
A major challenge to effective consultation is a lack 
of organisations in Africa that can represent both 
national and sub-national interests of smallholders in 
consultations. Too often, smallholders are spoken for by 
metropolitan civil society, overtly political organisations 
or industry apex bodies or unions that are dominated 
by the interests of larger producers. In Tanzania, a 
representative of the national land rights organisation 
Haki Ardhi called for more engagement of farmers at 
the grassroots: 
‘I would say, Haki Ardhi or MVIWATA are not suitable 
organisations to represent smallholders or women. 
It is the farmers themselves who are supposed to 
represent their issues about SAGCOT’ (interview, 10 
May 2018).
There is also a lack of organisations representing the 
interests of small-scale actors elsewhere in the agrifood 
supply chain. In Angola, for example, there were concerns 
that women who use the railway for small-scale food 
business and are crucial for food trade in the corridor 
region might not be adequately consulted or otherwise 
engaged in the Lobito Corridor Trade Facilitation Project 
because they lack a voice and political representation 
(interview, expert respondent, 10 May 2018).
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4.2.2. Impact assessments 
Judging by the literature reviewed, smallholders and 
women were apparently more likely to have been 
consulted for feasibility studies and environmental and 
social impact assessments. Such studies present an 
opportunity for third parties – including those that were 
not involved in the concept and vision stage – to highlight 
potentially negative elements of spatial development 
initiatives and pose questions. These questions can then 
be taken up further by farmers’ groups and civil society. 
A strategic environmental assessment conducted for 
the LAPSSET corridor in Kenya, for instance, found that 
that the design of LAPSSET was not compatible with 
the needs and preferences of communities (Repcon 
Associates, 2017). 
The experience from Kenya is instructive. LAPSSET 
was announced during a time of significant political 
change in Kenya, with the adoption of a new 
constitution in 2010 that gave prominence to public 
participation in policymaking and devolved power 
to county governments. Kenya already had laws 
requiring impact assessments (Kibugi, Mwathane and 
Makathimo, 2016). This has meant that consultation is 
taken rather seriously for state-backed projects and 
has fostered an environment for organised activism in 
corridor regions. 
Even if impact assessments are not carried out to 
a high standard (a charge often levelled at Kenyan 
assessments; see Kakonge, 2015), the process may 
provide a rare window for organisations acting on 
behalf of farmers to engage in the initiative and demand 
information. A drawback, however, is that impact 
assessments are typically conducted several months 
or years after the first consultations and feasibility 
studies, when visions and objectives have already 
begun to coalesce.
4.3. Land allocation
Some of the eight initiatives involved allocation by the 
government of land for investment in agriculture and 
in infrastructure. There has been extensive criticism 
by domestic and international civil society over this 
process, which, they allege, infringed the land and 
access rights of local people and failed to follow proper 
due diligence, including through participation and 
consultation of smallholders.
The criticism includes concerns over the process by 
which village land was made available to investors in 
the SAGCOT corridor of Tanzania (Bergius 2016); failure 
of the government’s consultations to allow for informal 
tenure rights of people living in areas earmarked for 
road constructions in the LAPSSET corridor (Kibugi, 
Mwathane and Makathimo, 2016); and claims that 
farmers were pressured to join ProSAVANA projects 
and allocate land in Mozambique (Clements, 2015; The 
Daily Vox, 2017).
In general, a lack of formal tenure security has a 
negative effect on the ability of women and smallholders 
to play an influential role in how land is used in the 
operationalisation of spatial development initiatives 
(e.g. Kibugi, Mwathane and Makathimo, 2016). If 
consultations and land-use planning processes are 
not well managed, there is a risk that the initiative will 
be co-opted by powerful or well-informed community 
members with formal tenure and that land management 
decisions taken at community members will jeopardise 
the rights of less powerful women and others. On the 
subject of a SAGCOT ‘Land Use Dialogue’ process, the 
representative of Haki Ardhi recalled: ‘The participation 
is very poor. I asked, we are going to a meeting of over 
40 scholars, activists, et cetera… then you only bring 
one man and woman from Iringa a day before who 
must be assisted by SAGCOT in translation? So, this is 
not good at all’ (interview, 10 May 2018).
The Bagré Growth Pole Project in Burkina Faso 
provides a more positive example of consultation with 
smallholders over land allocation. Because this project 
involved relocating villagers, and because of concerns 
over land rights grievances relating to an earlier 
project (Venot et al., 2017), the project administrator 
Bagrépôle conducted extensive land-use mapping 
with communities (CGIAR, 2016, p. 3). In 2012, the 
government published a decree that a comprehensive 
land survey must be conducted before irrigation 
infrastructure construction starts and that affected 
people have priority over subsequent land allocation 
(Venot et al., 2017). Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that the government had designated much of the local 
area as a Zone d’Utilité Publique, which gave it the right 
to expropriate people for the sake of public interest 
(Grow Africa, 2014). Furthermore, the land allocation 
arrangements that were designed by the World Bank 
and Bagrépôle as a result of the land-use mapping 
have been criticised for being based on unrealistic 
assumptions of the yields that farmers could expect to 
attain (CGIAR, 2016; Venot et al., 2017).
4.4. Governance
Our review suggests that smallholders are rarely 
given a position at the centre of governance or 
decision-making of agricultural investment initiatives. 
We were not able to view the membership details 
for each case, but the information we could access 
suggests that smallholders and women were not 
usually represented in governance bodies such as 
fund managers, secretariats, committees, councils or 
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boards. Although the agricultural sector may have a 
seat at the table, its representatives tend to be from 
agribusiness companies rather than farmers’ groups or 
cooperatives. In the case of LAPSSET, which is a less 
agriculturally oriented initiative than the other initiatives, 
it appeared that there was no one of the Board of 
Directors who had obvious experience in working with 
farmers, and it was reported that in at least one area 
of the corridor, Isiolo, the government was conducting 
community information-sharing and negotiations 
through the local county council (Sena, 2012, p. 17).
More positive examples include the Board of the BAGC 
Partnership, whose rules stipulated that its five directors 
must include a representative of a national farmers’ 
organisation. In Burkina Faso, smallholders had no 
decision-making in the Bagré Growth Pole governance 
structure, but the Bagrépôle administrators provided 
training for local participants to organise into farmers’ 
groups and women’s groups (interview, expert 
respondent, 29 May 2018).
One aspect of governance which could improve 
responsiveness to the needs of smallholders and 
women is systems for monitoring and accountability. In 
addition to the question of smallholder representation 
and accountability of their own actions, governance 
bodies also need to be strong enough to call investors 
and national governments to account over their 
commitments to smallholder inclusion (Jenkins, 2012; 
DFID, 2016). When the initiatives included programmes 
funded by the World Bank, IFC or AfDB, there were 
likely to be policies which call for smallholder interests 
and women’s rights to be protected (e.g. World Bank, 
2016a). Furthermore, the presence of foreign national 
governments as development partners may help 
to increase accountability in spatial development 
initiatives. Indeed, the fact that ProSAVANA was 
explicitly a triangular cooperation programme, with 
Brazil and Japan taking high-profile roles alongside 
Mozambique as ultimate architects and sponsors of 
the programme, seems to mean that the Brazilian and 
Japanese governments were more visible and more 
accountable than foreign governments in other cases 
(Monjane, 2017).
4.5. Implementation
Once corridor and growth pole initiatives have been 
established, the process of implementing the plans is 
slow and complex. There are three main considerations 
that affect inclusion during the implementation phase: 
whether smallholders and women’s groups are 
engaged in ongoing consultation and awareness-
raising, whether they can access funding and whether 
they participate in activities and business ventures.
4.5.1. Ongoing input, consultation and awareness-
raising
According to the theories of effective participation 
referred to earlier, consultation of smallholders 
and women’s groups should continue into the 
implementation phase of agricultural investment 
projects. Although external lenders and donors may 
have pushed for inclusivity, they are not necessarily 
the best-placed institutions for responding to changing 
priorities or emerging grievances. Smallholders and 
women need to be represented in the decision-
making and governance bodies of spatial development 
initiatives to have an input into how activities linked to 
the infrastructure components of corridors and growth 
poles are put into practice. In the Beira corridor, for 
example, there was criticism that local farmers were 
excluded from decision-making in a project involving 
seeds (Joala, 2016).
Some initiatives took steps to increase awareness, if 
not decision-making, among farming communities. 
In Burkina Faso, a radio station called Bagrepole FM 
was launched to cover 100km of the development 
zone, which may have helped to inform local farms if 
not give them a voice (interview, expert respondent, 
29 May 2018). In Nacala, a communications strategy 
aimed at nullifying civil society opposition included a 
radio campaign, distribution of flyers in local language 
and staging plays (ProSAVANA, 2018; No! to Landgrab 
Japan, 2016b). 
Yet the logistical constraints of conducting awareness-
raising campaigns in large crop farming and pastoralist 
regions are surely likely to have limited the impact 
of such campaigns, aside from any questions of 
deliberate lack of transparency on the part of project 
implementers. For example, in Kenya, the authors of 
the LAPSSET Strategic Environmental Assessment 
noted low literacy levels in many communities and 
reported that ‘without exception all stakeholders... 
complained of lacking information about LAPSSET’ 
(Repcon Associates, 2017, p. xxiii). However, it should 
be mentioned that efforts could have been made to find 
alternative ways of communicating with communities, 
for example through radio, social media, dance and 
dramatisations such as the examples mentioned in 
Burkino Faso and Nacala.
It is harder for initiatives that were initially focused 
on extractives or logistics, such as LAPSSET, 
Lobito, Nacala and WBLNDC, to incorporate 
farmer programmes and measures at a later stage. 
Embedding agribusiness priorities, especially of small-
scale farmers, pastoralists and businesspeople, into 
blueprints, governance structures and planning seems 
to be quite a slow process if these individuals were 
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not already being engaged with and thought about 
in the concept and design and consultation stages. 
In Angola, for instance, the AfDB mooted a trade 
facilitation programme that targets small-scale value 
chains, but the raison d’être of the Lobito rail corridor 
has always been to transport goods between copper 
mines and the coast. The main barriers to greater 
involvement of smallholders and women traders have 
been a lack of information among officials and the 
focus on copper transportation.
4.5.2. Access to funding
Using project documents, we investigated whether 
smallholders were able to participate in spatial 
development initiatives by accessing finance. Aside 
from credit that may be offered to smallholders through 
outgrower schemes, we found three examples of 
farmer-focused finance being offered: Farmcrowdy, a 
digital platform for sponsoring smallholders of 1-2ha in 
Nigeria, which appeared to be informally linked with the 
LAKAJI project; support for National Microfinance Bank 
of Tanzania to provide loans in the SAGCOT region; and 
a programme of matching grants and cash transfers 
for activities launched within the Bagré Growth Pole 
Project. Such examples are rare. We believe that this is 
because corridors and growth poles are based on the 
theory that improving the local investment and business 
environment will stimulate agricultural commercialisation 
and modernisation. This theory precludes the inclusion 
of micro-financing for individual farmers in corridor and 
growth pole designs. Hence, when the World Bank 
became a funder of a substantial SAGCOT project in 
2016, it justified its strategy of funding agribusinesses 
by stating that if the Bank just gave the funding to 
smallholders directly, SAGCOT would risk being ‘largely 
production-driven and insufficiently market-driven’ 
(World Bank, 2016a, p. 14).
In accordance with this theory, most of the initiatives 
include provision of higher-value funding to local 
businesses in the agriculture sector through matching 
grants. The grants are not intended to serve as micro-
loans for farmers, but rather as business loans for local 
SMEs and agribusinesses who are expected to increase 
up- or down-stream activity and thereby contribute to 
local economic development. For example, Beira’s 
Smallholder Support Facility for outgrower schemes or 
projects to address constraints faced by smallholders in 
accessing support services offered up to US$100,000 
and required applicants to submit written proposals 
to the BAGC secretariat, while the smallest value 
available from the Beira Catalytic Fund is £40,000. 
While farmer cooperatives may be able to access such 
grants if large enough (e.g. the Nacala corridor farmers’ 
group Forúm IAPACA accessed a MZN 250,000 loan 
from ProSAVANA), generally, most of the funding 
seems to have been awarded to input companies and 
agribusiness aggregators and processors.
Although smallholders are unlikely to avail of such 
matching grants directly, most of these funding 
schemes did stipulate smallholder inclusion as one of 
the eligibility criteria. An example is the Africa Fertiliser 
and Agribusiness Partnership’s matching grants 
scheme for input dealers in Beira, which required the 
dealers to arrange field days and demonstration plots 
for farmers – albeit with the purpose of stimulating 
demand for fertiliser among smallholders (African 
Fertilizer and Agribusiness Partnership, 2017). 
According to one document, JICA added conditions 
to the rules of a new Nacala Fund in 2012, such that 
the fund must ‘consider the concerns of small-scale 
farmers and contribute to poverty alleviation’ and must 
follow the international Principles for Responsible 
Agricultural Investment (No! to Landgrab Japan, 2016). 
The LAKAJI initiative in Nigeria offered grants to local 
entrepreneurs, who were encouraged to connect their 
proposals to SMEs and small producers and engage 
with women and youth (Nigeria NEXTT, 2017).
Matching grants and other funding sources were 
typically managed by a fund manager. Their ability 
to reach smallholders and women was affected by 
their organisational capacity, the closeness of their 
links to other actors and the consistency of their 
ultimate objective. In the case of SAGCOT, West and 
Haug (2017, p. 423) described a lack of coordination 
between national oversight bodies and local activities 
driven by donors and investors, partly because the 
fund set up to finance local agribusiness activities was 
not institutionally anchored in any national governance 
frameworks. In Mozambique, DFID explained that 
‘[fund manager] AgDevCo’s need to ensure its own 
commercial sustainability means that it increasingly 
invests in bigger, commercial agri-businesses to 
diversify its portfolio and reduce its risk exposure’ 
(DFID, 2017, p. 7).
4.5.3. Access to activities and business ventures
We can also consider access by smallholders and 
women to activities provided as part of corridors 
and growth poles, such as training, participation in 
outgrower schemes and access to inputs. The literature 
suggests that smallholders were involved in multiple 
activities and business ventures funded by donors or 
private-sector partners of corridors and growth poles. 
In some cases the activities and business ventures 
were clearly initiated by the corridor or growth pole 
organisers; in others, it appears that they would have 
taken place anyway.
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The activities and ventures are wide-ranging, and 
include:5  rehabilitating or introducing irrigation for small-
scale farming (Beira, Bagré); expanding outgrower 
schemes or brokering new contracts between 
smallholders and traders and processors (SAGCOT, 
Beira, Nacala/ProSAVANA, LAPSSET, Bagré); training, 
extension and capacity-building for smallholders to 
take advantage of opportunities emerging from the 
new infrastructure and value chains (SAGCOT, Beira, 
ProSAVANA, LAPSSET, Bagré); establishment of 
storage facilities and packhouses (SAGCOT, Bagré); 
and improving farmers’ access to seeds, fertiliser, 
machinery and other inputs (SAGCOT, Beira, LAPSSET, 
Bagré). In many cases, it appears that smallholders 
were engaged through cooperatives or associations, 
rather than on an individual basis.
This appears promising, but we need more information 
to assess whether certain farmers and pastoralists 
were excluded because they were too small or lacked 
sufficient capital and assets. In Beira, smallholdings 
under 5ha were not included in the corridor blueprint 
and 5ha minimum was required for participation in 
serviced farm blocks. A review by DFID of SAGCOT 
impacts found that ‘Typically the poorest farmers do 
not get priority treatment whereas the better off receive 
a large share of the benefits. This is principally for two 
reasons: the entrepreneurial few tend to rise to the 
top; and the drive by project implementing partners 
to identify “early bird” benefits and engage with “low 
hanging fruit”’ (DFID, 2016, p. 5). 
More information is also needed to assess whether the 
smallholder-oriented activities and business ventures 
have achieved proportional participation of female 
farmers and business owners. Some of the documents 
we reviewed do address women’s inclusion. For 
example, AfDB specified that women’s cooperatives 
would be included in its Lobito Corridor programme 
(AfDB, 2017a); in Burkina Faso, the World Bank set 
(relatively low) targets for including women among 
Bagré programme beneficiaries (Bagrépôle, 2014); 
and DFID has reported on the percentage of women 
reached through its Beira interventions (DFID, 2017). 
However, this aspect needs further investigation.
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5.1. Challenges to engagement
The preceding section argued that the engagement 
of smallholders and women’s groups has been mostly 
sub-optimal in all stages of the eight corridor and 
growth pole initiatives, from conception and design 
to project implementation. Our review suggests 
that the chances of smallholder and women’s group 
inclusion are highest in spatial development initiatives 
that: are demand-driven and/or strongly influenced 
by donors or development institutions that prioritise 
smallholder infrastructure or value chain programmes 
(as opposed to large-scale agriculture and nucleus–
outgrower schemes); and are not strongly influenced 
by agribusiness firms whose strategic priorities include 
large-scale land acquisition or commodity extraction. 
If we return to our typology from Section 3.2, this 
suggests that the most promising type of initiative from 
the point of view of smallholders and women’s groups 
is the ‘smallholder-focused corridor or growth pole 
with a strong emphasis on productivity or value chain 
development, driven by donors, development financial 
institutions or government’ – such as the LAKAJI and 
Bagré Growth Pole.
There are challenges for governments, donors and 
lenders or the managers of corridors and growth poles 
to ensure effective engagement of smallholders and 
women’s groups in spatial development initiatives. 
These challenges include:
• The need to balance interests of multiple parties in 
public - private partnerships.
• The need to attract investment and facilitate land 
acquisition.
• A lack of effective representative bodies for 
smallholders and businesses in many countries, 
especially at the local and sub-national government 
level.
• Antagonistic civil society organisations 
which in some cases campaign against the 
commercialisation of small - scale farming.
• Unhelpful project designs from external parties 
based on incorrect assumptions and a lack of 
understanding of local context. 
• Inadequate information and communication 
channels between and among stakeholders and 
decision-makers.
• Logistical challenges in reaching residents and 
resource users in rural areas.
5.2. Factors that enable success
Despite the challenges, the literature and interviews 
provide us with examples of where the needs of 
smallholders and women were being taken more 
seriously in spatial development initiatives. We identify 
three main reasons for this:
1. Enabling policies of governments and development 
partners;
2. Project proponents learning from the lessons of 
past initiatives;
3. Mediation and innovation from third parties.
These are discussed below, but we would first like 
to make a brief observation that in cases where an 
initiative took steps to ensure or increase smallholder 
participation, it sometimes led to delays. This included 
the household mapping in Bagré, the negotiations 
of a new Master Plan draft in Nacala, or caution 
over SAGCOT implementation in the face of civil 
society opposition in Tanzania (Club of Mozambique, 
2017; West and Haug, 2017; Venot et al., 2017). This 
needs to be acknowledged and addressed in any 
recommendations for spatial development initiatives 
to ensure smallholder inclusion and women’s 
development in future.
5.2.1. Enabling policies of governments, donors 
and lenders
Certain policies of governments, donors and lenders 
appeared to improve the conditions for smallholders 
and women to be involved in initiatives. These 
included Kenya’s law on impact assessments; or 
the LAKAJI project’s measures to increase youth 
participation in agriculture, which appear to come 
from strategic priorities of the Nigerian government 
and its development partner (USAID). Further enabling 
policies are listed in Table 5.1. Although these policies 
are important, it should be noted that their effect can 
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be limited and they can be relatively easily overridden 
by corporate or political interests. 
The strategic influence of governments, donors 
and lenders helps to ensure that the interests of 
smallholders are represented in initiatives – at least on 
paper. For example, Bagré Growth Pole seems to have 
been designed by the World Bank and the government 
with little private-sector influence. Both in documents 
and in terms of implementation, Bagré Growth Pole has 
markedly more clarity of purpose and greater focus on 
smallholders and small business than initiatives which 
were heavily influenced by the private sector.
Although like Bagré Growth Pole the LAKAJI plan 
had some commercial private-sector elements, 
because it was fundamentally a trade and value chain 
programme with no substantial private-sector backers 
or anchor businesses, the emphasis was on hard 
and soft infrastructural improvements to benefit small 
and medium-scale farmers. The LAKAJI investment 
blueprint architects were clearly thinking about how 
to improve marketing conditions for smallholders, took 
note of existing programmes of government or donors 
that targeted small farmers, and seem to have given 
some consideration of food security. Nevertheless, we 
do not have any evidence that the architects consulted 
Table 5.1. Policies that enable engagement of smallholders and women’s groups
Stage Enabling policy
Concept and design • Government policy requires agricultural investments to include 
smallholders and set limits on the size of large-scale operations.
• Government encourages planners to seek downstream partners 
and investors, which will help to guarantee buyers for produce and 
to support local or regional business opportunities in value addition, 
processing and marketing.
• Donor policy for programmes and interventions includes smallholder 
inclusion or women’s empowerment.
• Planners create forums or spaces for stakeholders to hold a dialogue 
on potential risks and benefits and agree priorities for infrastructural 
investment.
Consultation • Government or donor policy requires an impact assessment to be 
undertaken, especially if it stipulates public participation.
• Political devolution encourages participation of stakeholders at local 
level.
• Donors and development partners fund capacity-building to ensure 
that farmers’ groups, women’s groups or other stakeholder interests 
have sufficient capacity for organisation and professional participation.
Land allocation • Government policy requires land surveying prior to development.
• Government policy prioritises land titling or other measures to ensure 
land tenure secure security prior to investments.
• Local-level land management institutions are democratic.
Governance • Policies of development partners and investors include due diligence, 
safeguards, monitoring and accountability measures.
• Initiative sets quotas for minimum representation of small-scale 
producers, including women, on management committees or similar 
governance structures.
Implementation • Smallholder inclusion is included as a selection criterion in government 
or donor policy for matching grants or similar funds.
• Policies of development partners, investors and fund managers 
include micro-finance, patient capital and long-term funding 
commitments.
Source: Authors’ own
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smallholders, or that they considered inclusion or 
gender in the agribusiness models that they proposed.
5.2.2. Measures for more participatory 
governance
The literature provides examples measures to improve 
the engagement of smallholders in the governance of 
public–private partnerships and other development 
projects. Some projects set quotas to ensure a 
minimum representation of farmers, or women, on 
management committees or similar governance 
structures (Saint Vil, 2011). Simultaneously, project 
partners can ensure that farmers’ groups, women’s 
groups or other stakeholder interests have sufficient 
capacity for organisation and professional participation 
(Mansuri and Rao, 2013; Fairtrade Foundation, 2014). 
Mechanisms for information-sharing and transparency 
may be designed (Vogelsperger, Lakoussan and 
Teshome, 2017). Project managers can experiment 
with additional forums, outside formal governance 
structures, for creating two-way communication 
channels with smallholders, women’s groups and small 
business. The agribusiness incubator 2SCALE reports 
the example of a dairy value chain project in Nigeria, 
where the partners decided to hold pre-meetings 
with farming communities before official partnership 
meetings:
‘All core partners spend one full day in the field, 
with farmers and other stakeholders (vet service 
providers, transporters, feed suppliers, community 
livestock workers, etc.) to interact with them and 
get their inputs on the Program’s progress. In 2016, 
this went a step further, with the organization of 
separate meetings with Fulani men on the one hand 
and Fulani women on the other hand, to give women 
more opportunities to speak up’ (Vogelsperger, 
Lakoussan and Teshome, 2017, p. 7). 
Similar examples were visible among the eight corridors 
and growth poles in this study. Note, for example, 
the land-use mapping conducted by Bagrépôle 
and its organisational training for local farmers’ and 
women’s groups; and the rules for representation 
on the governance bodies of BAFC and SAGCOT. 
Where the policies of a corridor or growth pole 
include extensive and effective awareness-raising and 
consultation, and minimum inclusion of smallholder 
and women representatives in their decision-making 
bodies, they move closer to the ideals of empowering, 
transformative participation.
We also saw some limited positive examples of activities 
during the implementation stage of a corridor or cluster 
initiative that engaged with and supported small-
scale actors. All of the initiatives for which documents 
were available (Bagrépôle, Beira, LAPSSET, Nacala/
ProSAVANA and SAGCOT) reported activities 
that supported small-scale livelihoods through 
infrastructure, training, improving access to inputs or 
facilitating market linkages.
5.2.3. Constructive resistance
Resistance to plans for corridors or growth poles is very 
common. Opposition has been widely documented for 
SAGCOT, Beira, Nacala/ProSAVANA, LAPSSET and 
Bagré. Although it has not always led to change, we 
believe that resistance from farmers’ groups and civil 
society can result in greater smallholder involvement.
It has been argued that smallholders lack representation 
in Tanzania and Kenya (DFID, 2016; 15; Sena, 2012). 
Yet opposition to SAGCOT and LAPSSET has still been 
articulated strongly, mainly because the campaigning 
against corridor development was taken up by activists, 
local NGOs as well as national and international NGOs 
that advocate for land rights and pro-smallholder 
policies, and by environmental NGOs. Kenya saw 
long-lasting resistance to LAPSSET infrastructural 
developments in Lamu County by the Save Lamu 
coalition. In Tanzania, civil society opposition led 
the SAGCOT Centre to introduce a Memorandum of 
Understanding with some key farmers’ groups that 
represented thousands of smallholders (West and 
Haug, 2017, p. 427). Later, international actors led by 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) helped to set up a Green Reference Group in 
2016, through which implementers of SAGCOT began 
to engage with non-state actors, including farmers, and 
the Land Use Dialogue – ‘an inclusive multi-stakeholder 
platform for debate on proper planning and use of land 
in the SAGCOT region’ (SAGCOT Centre, 2016, p. 8). 
In other countries, smallholder groups have had 
a stronger voice. This includes Burkina Faso and 
Mozambique. Here, a network of local and international 
groups formed effective coalitions of resistance, linking 
local smallholders’ concerns to broader advocacy 
around food sovereignty and land rights. Burkina Faso 
is the host of the West African farmers’ organisation 
ROPPA (Reseau des Organisations Paysannes et des 
Producteurs Agricoles de l'Afrique de l'Ouest), which 
has been involved in high-profile criticism of land 
grabbing in Africa in recent years. In 2015, the national 
smallholder organisation, Confederation Paysanne du 
Faso, joined forces with ROPPA to object to the plans 
for Bagré Growth Pole, and began to organise a series 
of workshops with local and French NGOs, activists 
and a prominent farmers’ union from Bagré, UGPRB 
(Confederation Paysanne du Faso, 2016).
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In Mozambique, there was strong and effective 
resistance to the ProSAVANA project by the 
national peasants’ union UNAC (União Nacional de 
Camponeses) and ADECRU (Acção Académica 
para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais), 
comprehensively documented by Clements (2015). 
As in Burkina, the national organisations made 
connections with international NGOs. JICA, under 
pressure from Japanese NGOs, drove changes to 
the ProSAVANA Master Plan in order to reduce the 
emphasis on large-scale agribusiness and increase 
the emphasis on smallholder farming. On paper, the 
result was greater inclusion of smallholders at the 
implementation stage. However, some researchers 
claim that in practice, the interests of large-scale 
investors and the commercial soy lobby remained 
dominant in Nacala (No! to Landgrab Japan, 2016; 
Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016). Furthermore, the 
resistance became splintered and polarised (Club of 
Mozambique, 2017; Farmlandgrab, 2017). 
In Mozambique and elsewhere, it is through the work 
of donor-funded NGOs that smallholders and women 
build their capacity for negotiation and advocacy, 
strengthening their capacity to engage with government 
and investors. Often the vehicle for farmers and 
women to access NGO support is through producer 
associations, which facilitate access not only to 
agricultural inputs but also to information, government 
officials and capacity-building programmes.
5.2.4. Mediation and innovation from third 
parties
While specialised NGOs are best placed to work on 
advocacy with local communities and to support 
them in their goals, a common pattern is for them 
to coalesce into coalitions over time and link up with 
international NGOs to amplify their message and tap 
funding. This links to another factor which can increase 
the articulation of smallholder and women’s needs in 
spatial development initiatives: the role of third parties 
as mediators and enablers of innovative solutions.
The best example of this was observed with the 
Bagré Growth Pole project. Here, it appears that the 
French research institution CIRAD played an important 
role as intermediary between local farmers and the 
administrators of the project, Bagrepole, and the World 
Bank. Engaged as an official partner to the project, 
CIRAD conducted action research and analysis which 
revealed farmer preferences over crops and challenged 
assumptions made by project planners about yields 
and land allocation (CGIAR, 2016). CIRAD was able 
to articulate these findings to the administrators and 
advocate for greater participation of smallholders.
In Tanzania, the land rights organisation Haki Ardhi 
trained 700 voluntary Land Rights Monitors in 
communities throughout the country, including in the 
SAGCOT corridor region. A staff member explained: 
‘These people help us explain to their fellow villagers 
what the implications of SAGCOT in the long run are 
and what the practices in other countries in contract 
farming are, et cetera’ (interview, 10 May 2018).
Lessons from Mozambique tell us that mediators 
must take care to avoid establishing institutions that 
risk being seen either by civil society as mechanisms 
used by corridor proponents to counter resistance or 
by project managers as overly political groups that lie 
too far from the mainstream dialogue. Mediation by a 
development partner can also be resource-intensive 
(Oxfam Novib, 2015). Bearing these caveats in mind, we 
can conclude that there are likely benefits when spatial 
development initiatives are open to full engagement of 
third parties who can act as mediators or introduce 
innovative practices and technologies that increase 
participation and dialogue.
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According to the documentary review, fieldwork and expert interviews involved in this research, smallholder 
and women’s organisations were only minimally involved in the governance of African corridor and growth pole 
projects as of 2019. This was partly because smallholders and women’s groups were rarely, if ever, invited to 
contribute to the initial conception and design of the initiatives. As the projects unfolded, land rights abuses 
occurred, and some poorly designed support programmes were initiated. However, there were some attempts at 
engagement of smallholders during phases of consultation, land allocation and project implementation.
Challenges to increasing and deepening their engagement included: a lack of effective organisations to 
represent small-scale farmers and businesses; inadequate structures for information-sharing, monitoring and 
accountability; some incorrect assumptions and biases; overly centralised planning and decision-making; and 
the need for project planners to address the sometimes contradictory infrastructure and commercial needs of 
private-sector investors. 
The findings in this study suggest that the prospects of smallholder and women’s group inclusion may be better 
in corridors and growth poles that on the one hand, are strongly influenced by donors or development institutions 
that prioritise smallholder infrastructure or value chain programmes; and on the other are not strongly influenced 
by agribusiness firms whose strategic priorities include large-scale land acquisition or commodity extraction.
There are measures that project managers, governments, donors and lenders can take to improve the engagement 
of smallholders, women’s groups and small agribusinesses, and therefore increase the likelihood of achieving 
long-term sustainability of projects and broad development outcomes. For example, they can build the capacity 
of farmers’ and women’s organisations to participate in decision-making structures and set quotas for their 
inclusion in governance bodies. Governments and lenders can introduce requirements for smallholder inclusion 
and gender-sensitive approaches as conditions and selection criteria for agricultural investments, farmer training 
and value chain programmes, while project managers can establish communications and monitoring procedures.
Overall, the managers of corridor and growth pole projects must learn from the lessons of past initiatives and 
begin dialogues with small-scale agricultural actors in corridor regions as soon as possible in the development 
process to build trust, incorporate their needs into the design and develop structures for sustained engagement 
over time.
Outside official project management and policy channels, smallholders and women can also increase their 
engagement through activism and lobbying. They may even be effective in changing project blueprints. These 
energies can be amplified and channelled by neutral third parties who can help to mediate between stakeholders 
and develop innovative ways in which the voices of smallholders and women can be heard.
6 CONCLUSION
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ENDNOTES
i. In this paper, ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ refer to activities and actors in agricultural and agribusiness 
supply chains, where upstream refers to producers and their input suppliers, and downstream refers to agri-
commodity processors, traders and food manufacturers.
ii. Women’s share of labour in livestock farming was not estimated by the authors.
iii. There is no consensus on terminology, but in this paper, unless specified, we use the term ‘smallholder’ 
to refer to small-scale crop farmers, small-scale farmers with livestock, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. 
For a discussion of the factors that define small scale, including size of holding and animal numbers, use of 
paid labour and extent of market integration, see Khalil et al. (2017). We also refer to people who run small-
scale agribusinesses, which are active in agricultural supply chains up- or down-stream. It is understood 
that any of these actors may be women, who are highlighted separately in this paper because of concerns 
that, while acknowledging other aspects of difference such as class or age, women are at particular risk of 
marginalisation and exclusion.
iv. “In the nucleus–outgrowers model, contract farming is combined with a plantation, so that contracted 
smallholders, or ‘outgrowers’, complement production on a central estate” (Smalley, 2013:10).
v. We do not include in this list any activities that were offered to communities in the Bagré Growth Pole as 
compensation for resettlement (see World Bank, 2017).
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